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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYER
REGULATION: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Deborah L. Rhode* & Alice Woolley**
Regulation shapes every area of modern economic life. Getting
regulation right—knowing when it is necessary, what it should accomplish,
and what form it should take—is a critical part of policymaking in every
society. Developing an effective oversight structure requires a complex
analysis of each society’s particular historical, cultural, and legal
foundations. Regulation of the practice of law is no different, although it
has received surprisingly little public attention in the United States and
Canada. That is not for lack of problems, and other countries with similar
legal systems, such as Australia and England and Wales, have begun to do
better at addressing common oversight failures. This Article explores why
problems in American and Canadian legal regulation persist, and identifies
reform strategies that build on recent innovations from abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
Although similar in many ways, the United States and Canada have
constitutional and cultural differences that affect lawyer regulation. In the
United States, constitutional requirements of separation of powers have
enabled state courts to assert inherent authority over professional
regulation. In Canada, the provincial legislatures have granted regulatory
power to the law societies, which are governed by lawyers elected from the
bar. In theory, each structure has its strengths. The American system
protects the independence of the profession, and provides a somewhat more
disinterested oversight body than one controlled directly by the bar. The
Canadian system offers greater potential for public accountability and
checks on regulatory performance. In practice, however, the oversight
structures of both countries have similar weaknesses. The profession in
both the United States and Canada determines the focus of regulatory
activities, and too often the emphasis is on protecting its own economic and
reputational interests. Frequently, the result is inadequate responsiveness to
consumer concerns and unduly punitive sanctions for misconduct that
occurs outside professional contexts but that threatens lawyers’ public
image.
In our view, the fundamental problem in both countries is structural. No
matter how well intentioned, no occupational group is situated to take a
disinterested perspective on matters that implicate its own status and
livelihood. Nothing in the history of bar self-governance suggests that
lawyers are an exception. Recognition of this fact has led reformers in
Australia and England to develop structures in which the profession shares
authority with, and is accountable to, non-lawyer regulators. These reforms
are part of a broader trend to encourage greater accountability and
transparency in regulatory structures that we believe should inform
American and Canadian governance systems. 1
Our proposals begin from two key premises about regulatory objectives.
The first is that certain imperfections in the market for legal services justify
external oversight. 2 Such imperfections include what economists variously
describe as: information asymmetry and barriers; free riders; and
externalities. A second premise is that regulatory structures should focus
on public protection rather than public image.
1. See Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark, & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Regulatory Objectives
for the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2012). As the OECD Report on Legal
Services notes, there is a risk that self-regulation may promote the interests of the profession
without yielding corresponding benefits to the public at large. OECD, COMPETITIVE
RESTRICTIONS IN LEGAL PROFESSIONS 2007, at 19–20 (2008).
2. A perfectly functioning market has five features: (1) numerous buyers and sellers,
(2) homogeneous products that can be readily compared, (3) adequate information for buyers
and sellers, (4) no barriers to entry and exit, and (5) no externalities. As Alice Woolley has
argued elsewhere, the legal services market has only one of these features—there are
numerous buyers and sellers in the market. Alice Woolley, Imperfect Duty: Lawyers’
Obligation to Foster Access to Justice, 45 ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 107, 120–38
(2008). See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000).
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Regulation fails when it does not effectively deter or remedy breaches of
lawyers’ obligations to clients and to the legal system. In the market for
legal services, a common imperfection involves many consumers’ inability
to make accurate assessments about the services they receive, either before
or after purchase. Most individual (as opposed to business) clients are oneshot purchasers. Their lack of experience, coupled with the expense and
difficulties of comparative shopping for non-homogenous professional
services, makes it hard for such consumers to identify cost-effective
practices. 3 Even sophisticated corporate clients may experience problems
in assessing the necessity or efficiency of certain services and detecting
fraudulent billing. 4 Results are an inadequate gauge of professional
performance because they may reflect factors beyond lawyers’ control, such
as the fallibilities of judges or jurors, or the perversity of opposing parties.
Information barriers may adversely affect the quality or distort the
pricing of professional services. On the one hand, if clients cannot
accurately discriminate among the services available, and no regulatory
body enforces minimum standards, lawyers will lack adequate incentives to
invest time, education, and resources in providing effective services.
Competition may encourage attorneys to cut corners and a “market for
lemons” may develop, in which bad lawyering drives out the good, and the
public pays the price. On the other hand, in the absence of adequate
information, consumers may assume that status and price signify quality
and will hire a more expensive lawyer than they require. In the absence of
some external regulation to ensure the cost effectiveness of legal services,
too many purchasers may end up with incompetent, overpriced, or unethical
practitioners.
A further difficulty involves “free riders,” that is, those who gain from
bar standards without personally observing them. For example, the bar
collectively has an interest in having lawyers conduct themselves in such a
way as to maintain public trust. Absent effective regulatory structures,
however, individual attorneys will have inadequate economic incentives to
avoid cheating; they can benefit as free riders from the bar’s general
reputation without adhering to the rules that maintain it.
A final category of market imperfections involves external costs to
society and third parties from conduct that may be advantageous to
particular clients and their lawyers. For example, the public generally has
an interest in seeing prompt and just resolution of disputes in circumstances
where individual clients would be willing to pay lawyers to delay or
obstruct truth-finding processes.
3. Legal services are non-homogeneous both because the needs of clients are not the
same and also (and more importantly) because the services offered by one lawyer may vary
radically from the services offered by another in terms of efficiency, diligence, skill, and
legal knowledge.
4. In one survey of American lawyers, only 44 percent said they were never influenced
by the temptation to do more work than the client needed, and 43 percent believed that at
least 10 percent of work by American lawyers is unnecessary. William G. Ross, How
Widespread Is Unethical Billing?, ACCT. & FIN. PLAN. FOR L. FIRMS, L.J. NEWSLETTERS, Oct.
2007, at 2.
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All of these problems call for regulation that makes protection of client
and societal interests the paramount concern. Imperfections in the market
for legal services require oversight measures to ensure competent and
ethical service to clients at a reasonable price. The central challenge is to
design regulatory processes that preserve professional independence but
that also secure professional accountability where market mechanisms are
unable to do so. By this standard, both American and Canadian oversight
structures fall short.
I. THE UNITED STATES DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
The American disciplinary process has never lacked for critics. Over the
last four decades, both bar commissions and independent scholars have
identified serious problems in responses to misconduct. As Richard Abel
summarized their consensus: “[T]oo little unethical behavior is named,
blamed, claimed, and punished.” 5 Most Americans agree. Only about a
third of the public believes that the bar does a good job disciplining
lawyers. 6 “Too slow, too secret, too soft, and too self-regulated” has been a
widespread complaint. 7 Yet lawyers themselves tend to fault the system on
precisely the opposite grounds. Many see it as “unfair, oppressive, and
counterproductive” for those subject to regulation. 8
Both critiques have some basis in fact, although it is consumers who pay
the greatest price. The basic problem is structural. As John Coffee puts it,
self-regulation permits “the continued government of the guild, by the
guild, and for the guild.” 9 What that has meant for bar discipline is too
little focus on consumer protection and too much focus on lawyers’
reputational concerns. Many disciplinary authorities do not even handle
garden variety misconduct—“mere” negligence and overcharging—because
of resource limitations and the (erroneous) assumption that other civil
liability remedies are available.10 But virtually all authorities sanction
misconduct committed outside of professional relationships in what is too
often a misdirected effort to prevent discredit of the bar.
A. The Flawed Structure of Professional Discipline
The basic difficulty is that state supreme courts have claimed inherent
authority to regulate the profession but have insufficient time, interest, or
5. RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:
LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 505 (2008). For the ABA’s recommendations as to new model
procedures for discipline at the state bar level, see ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ix–xvii, 40–45 (1991).
6. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 158 (2000); see also
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 63 (ABA ed.,1999).
7. ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at
xxiv.
8. ABEL, supra note 5, at 505.
9. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1316 (2003). For similar views, see Anthony E. Davis, Professional
Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 231 (1996).
10. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 983 (5th ed. 2009).
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capacity to exercise that authority effectively. 11 Most of these courts face
crushing caseloads, and their justices have neither the resources nor the
expertise to ensure adequate oversight.12 Nor do they have much
inclination or incentive to challenge the organized bar on matters that hold
great importance for lawyers but are not priorities for the general public.
Judges share the background and world view of those they claim to
regulate. As social theorists note, a group’s distinctive norms, behaviors,
and ways of thinking construct an institutional identity that shapes decision
making. 13 Moreover, most state judiciaries are elected and depend on
lawyers for endorsements, rankings, and campaign contributions. 14 Even in
states where judges are selected through merit processes, state and local
bars exercise substantial influence. 15 The judiciary is also dependent on
support from the organized bar concerning salaries and budgets, and is
readily accessible to lawyer lobbying at conferences, annual meetings, and
social gatherings. 16 By contrast, consumer interests rarely have such
opportunities for influence.
Part of the problem is the public’s lack of information and incentives to
mobilize on the issue. Few voters are aware of the judiciary’s role in
regulating the profession, and no powerful groups have sought to make
such issues relevant in judicial elections. 17 Help Abolish Legal Tyranny
(HALT), the only national consumer organization that focuses on reforming
the legal profession, has only about 20,000 members. 18 Its resources and
influence cannot compare to those of local and national bar associations that
represent close to a million lawyers. 19 Nor have consumer protection
agencies been willing to intervene and even the playing field.20 A primary
reason is that the individual clients and third parties most vulnerable to
lawyers’ misconduct lack political leverage and incentives to demand
11. This argument draws on earlier work, including Deborah L. Rhode, Professional
Regulation and Public Service:
An Unfinished Agenda, in THE PARADOX OF
PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 153, 161–68 (Scott L.
Cummings ed., 2011); RHODE, supra note 6, at 158–65.
12. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1207 (2003).
13. BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
133 (2011); Barton, supra note 12, at 1176; Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically
Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 456, 459 (2008)
[hereinafter Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?].
14. Barton, supra note 12, at 1187, 1195; Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the
Interests of the Legal Profession?, supra note 13, at 458.
15. Kelly Armitage, Denial Ain’t Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of Judicial
Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 625,
656 (2002); Barton, supra note 12, at 1199.
16. BARTON, supra note 13, at 133; Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the
Interests of the Legal Profession?, supra note 13, at 458; Barton, supra note 12, at 1200.
17. Barton, supra note 12, at 1203.
18. HALT, http://www.halt.org/about/about-halt/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
19. The American Bar Association alone has nearly 400,000 members. See Membership,
ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/membership.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
20. Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian
Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 25.
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reform. 21 Most are “one shot” players who use lawyers infrequently and
episodically. In other regulatory contexts, the constituency that has been
most effective in mobilizing consumers or representing their interests has
been public interest lawyers. But the success of their efforts often depends
on financial support and pro bono contributions from the private bar. 22
Such assistance is hard to come by on issues that put the bar’s own interests
at risk. 23 The few sporadic efforts that have been made to create more
publicly accountable disciplinary structures have proceeded with little
consumer support and have folded in the face of opposition by the bar. 24
As a consequence, courts have delegated day-to-day oversight authority
to bar organizations or to commissions that are nominally independent but
that are closely aligned with bar interests. Lawyers can appeal disciplinary
sanctions to the state supreme courts, but consumers have no effective
recourse for decisions or processes that are unresponsive to their interests.
Bar oversight processes are almost entirely reactive and generally respond
only to complaints of serious professional misconduct or criminal
convictions. 25 Although almost all jurisdictions have ethical rules requiring
lawyers to report evidence of misconduct, these mandates are widely
ignored and rarely enforced. Only about 10 percent of the complaints to
disciplinary bodies come from the profession. 26 Yet despite lawyers’
notorious unwillingness to inform on colleagues, the most comprehensive
survey found only four disciplinary actions over two decades for failure to
report ethical violations.27
The resulting reliance on client grievances leads to under-inclusive
remedies. The system fails to respond when clients benefit from the
misconduct, as in abusive litigation practices or complicity in fraud, or
when victims lack information or incentives to file complaints.
Sophisticated business clients generally find that withdrawal of business or
non-payment of fees are more effective remedies than those available from
the disciplinary system. Even less powerful consumers who lack such
options often doubt that bringing the matter to the bar will produce a
satisfactory response. They are generally correct. The vast majority of
grievances are dismissed without investigation because they fail to state a
plausible claim within agency jurisdiction; for the remaining claims,
21. RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING ETHICAL MISCONDUCT 476
(2011); RHODE, supra note 6, at 7–8, 208.
22. See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 2027, 2074–75 (2008).
23. The only public interest legal organization that has been significantly involved in
reforming the legal profession is Public Citizen, and the resources it has been able to devote
to the issue are extremely limited. Id. at 2040.
24. For discussion of efforts in California and Florida, see ABEL, supra note 21, and
BARTON, supra note 13, at 139.
25. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 10, at 982–83; Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, SelfRegulation, and Consumer Protection: Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 53, 61–
65.
26. ABEL, supra note 5, at 502.
27. See Lance J. Rogers, Misconduct: Conference Panelists Call for Clarification of
Obligation to Report Peer Misconduct, 23 LAW. MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT 297 (2007).
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inadequate resources often limit the effectiveness of responses. 28 Only
about 3 percent of cases brought to disciplinary authorities result in public
sanctions. 29 Even where the bar finds significant misconduct, sanctions are
often lax and clients are not guaranteed adequate compensation. 30 For
cases involving minor grievances of neglect, negligence, and fee disputes
that authorities decline to handle, malpractice litigation is generally too
expensive, and the lawyers most likely to be subject to complaints
frequently lack civil liability insurance. 31 Although a growing number of
states have alternative dispute resolution systems for minor grievances and
fee disputes, few of these programs are mandatory and not all are perceived
as effective by clients. 32 Many states also lack effective diversion systems
or remedial approaches that respond to the causes of ethical violations.
Attorneys too often receive reprimands rather than the training and
oversight that will assist them in averting future problems. 33
The problem is compounded by the absence of transparency. Most
ethical violations by lawyers or inadequacies in bar responses are not
visible to the public. Except in four states, bar disciplinary agencies will
not disclose the existence of a complaint unless they have found a
disciplinary violation or probable cause to believe that a violation has
occurred. Lawyers with as many as twenty complaints under investigation
have received a clean bill of health when a consumer asked for information
about their records, and it has sometimes taken as many as forty-four
complaints over a decade to get a practitioner disbarred.34 Even where
28. See Michael S. Frisch, No Stone Left Unturned: The Failure of Attorney SelfRegulation in the District of Columbia, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325 (2005); Maute, supra
note 25, at 62 n.39, 64–65.
29. See Mark J. Fucile, Law Firm Risk Management by the Numbers, 20 PROF. LAW., no.
2, 2010, at 28.
30. See ABEL, supra note 5, at 500; Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes
Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1454 (2004). Disciplinary bodies have lacked authority to impose
fines or order damages, though they can condition decisions on restitution. Where restitution
is not ordered or the lawyer lacks sufficient assets, victims of intentional misconduct can
seek compensation from client security funds, but they are insufficient to cover most claims.
See Maute, supra note 25, at 65 & nn.43–44; ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY,
STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., SURVEY OF LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION
2005–2007, at 27 (2008) (reflecting that funds paid for about 10 percent of claims).
31. An estimated 20 to 50 percent of lawyers lack liability insurance. See RHODE &
LUBAN, supra note 10, at 1016.
32. See Maute, supra note 25, at 62 n.38. Only nine states have mandatory fee
arbitration. See Fee Arbitration for Attorney Costs, LAWYERS.COM, http://alternative-disputeresolution.lawyers.com/arbitration/Fee-Arbitration-for-Attorney-Costs.html. For discussion
of disciplinary systems’ lack of attention to performance issues and the rates of client
dissatisfaction, see RHODE, supra note 6, at 159, 181; Deborah Rosenthal, Every Lawyer’s
Nightmare, CAL. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 23, 24. In Oregon’s system, a majority of clients were
not satisfied with the resolution of their complaints, although it is unclear how much of that
dissatisfaction was related to unrealistic expectations. See generally OR. STATE BAR,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OREGON STATE BAR CLIENT ASSISTANCE OFFICE (2006).
33. See Vivian Berger, Mediation: An Alternative Means of Processing Attorney
Disciplinary Complaints, 16 PROF. LAW. 21, 24 (2005).
34. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2 & nn.9–10 (2007); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 160–61.
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sanctions are imposed, the public lacks a ready way of discovering them.
Not all states publish information concerning disciplinary sanctions, and
many do not do so online or in forms that consumers can access. 35 Because
the vast majority of complaints never result in public sanctions, and the vast
majority of malpractice actions never result in published opinions,
consumers often lack crucial knowledge about lawyers’ practice histories.
The profession and the public also lack information that would enable
them to assess the adequacy of disciplinary processes. Few states publish
aggregate data concerning the nature of grievances, characteristics of
attorneys, and sanctions imposed. 36 The lack of transparency concerning
the treatment of complaints, and the lack of proactive oversight of corporate
lawyers whose clients seldom file grievances, feeds practitioners’ suspicion
that the disciplinary system is biased against small firms, solo practitioners,
and racial and ethnic minorities.37 The studies to date have not been
adequate to evaluate those concerns.38 Nor do the twenty states that have
diversion programs publish statistics on the effectiveness of these programs
in preventing misconduct and addressing clients’ concerns.39
One consequence of the profession’s failure to develop adequate
regulatory processes is that other decision makers have stepped into the
breach and supplemented or supplanted bar oversight. For example,
lawyers’ complicity in some of the major financial scandals of the early
twenty-first century led to no disciplinary actions but major new
legislation. 40 Congress required, over the ABA’s vehement objections, that
counsel in publicly traded companies make internal reports of potential
fraud to corporate leadership.41 Other federal and state agencies have
imposed ethical standards beyond what bar rules require, and prosecutors
have brought criminal proceedings where disciplinary authorities have
failed to act. 42 As John Leubsdorf summarizes the trend: “[M]ore and
35. Levin, supra note 34, at 20–21; Vesna Jaksic, Attorney Discipline Web Data
Uneven, NAT’L L. J., Sept. 10, 2007, at 1, 7.
36. Lynn Mather, How and Why Do Lawyers Misbehave?, in THE PARADOX OF
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 11, at 130.
37. Id. at 111, 119. For example, almost half of Oregon lawyers believe that the
disciplinary system is biased, largely based on the size of the disciplined lawyer’s firm. A
majority of African-American lawyers in Illinois believe that race plays a factor in
disciplinary decisions. But only a small minority of white lawyers believe that race played a
role in the disciplinary process. Levin, supra note 34, at 6–7.
38. Levin, supra note 34, at 7.
39. Id. at 4–6.
40. None of the lawyers involved in Enron faced bar sanctions. BARTON, supra note 13,
at 253–54.
41. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Enron and Ethics, in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 625, 628 (Nancy Rappaport & Bala G.
Dharan eds., 2004); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147,
1170 & n.109 (2009).
42. Paul F. Rothstein, “Anything You Say May Be Used Against You”: A Proposed
Seminar on the Lawyer’s Duty to Warn of Confidentiality’s Limits in Today’s Post-Enron
World, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1749 n.16 (2007) (noting the increased trend toward
criminal prosecutions of lawyers in connection with clients’ crimes); Schneyer, supra note
20, at 16–17 (noting the rise in regulation by Congress and federal agencies); Laurel S.
Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal
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more regulators have sought to regulate the bar . . . [and] have become
increasingly unwilling to defer to either bar associations or courts.”43
Clients and commercial organizations have also entered the arena. Retainer
agreements by large companies have included ethical mandates, insurance
companies have insisted on additional ethics-related safeguards as a
condition of malpractice coverage, and lawyer directories and websites have
sometimes included information on disciplinary history and/or client
reviews. 44
Yet these initiatives have fallen short. State courts’ assertion of inherent
regulatory powers have limited the scope of comprehensive administrative
and legislative intervention. 45 And insurance companies’ leverage has been
limited by the unwillingness of all but one state bar to require that lawyers
have malpractice coverage. 46 Moreover, on some matters, such as the bar’s
oversight of non-professional misconduct, there have been no external
efforts to intervene, despite the inherent problems in current enforcement
practices.
B. The Undisciplined Scope of Disciplinary Review:
Non-professional Misconduct
Whatever its inadequacies in responding to misconduct that occurs within
a lawyer-client relationship, the bar has often been highly vigilant in its
responses to criminal offenses occurring outside it. That should come as no
surprise. Such cases are relatively easy to pursue, because the hard
investigative work has already been done by prosecutors, and the offenders
are often highly unsympathetic to both the public and the profession.
Virtually all states have a version of the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct that authorizes discipline for a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer, or for conduct that involves “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation,” or is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”47
ABA standards identify eleven aggravating circumstances and sixteen

Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189 (describing entities regulating
lawyers); Zacharias, supra note 41, at 1169–70 (discussing agency rules and criminal
prosecutions).
43. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009).
44. For client agreements, see Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, Privatizing
Professionalism: Client Control of Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2012). For
insurance companies, see Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of
Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996). For client reviews in Avvo, MartindaleHubbell, and the Association of Corporate Counsel, see ABEL, supra note 21, at 474–75.
45. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation: The Role of the
Inherent Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 6–13 (1990); see also supra
notes 11–16 and accompanying text.
46. Only one state, Oregon, requires insurance, and only five others require disclosure to
the client if the lawyer does not have coverage. Maute, supra note 25, at 71.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b)–(d) (2011).
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mitigating circumstances that can be relevant in determining sanctions,48
which permits widely varying responses to similar offenses across and even
within jurisdictions. 49
Part of the difficulty lies in the absence of evidence linking particular
conduct to the justifications for bar discipline. Courts have articulated two
main rationales for professional oversight of non-professional offenses.
One is protection of the public and the administration of justice from future
violations of ethical standards. The other is preserving popular confidence
in the integrity of lawyers and the legal system. In principle, both seem
uncontroversial; in practice, both have proven highly problematic.
The public protection rationale assumes that those who break rules in
non-professional settings are also likely to do so in professional settings.
Yet a vast array of psychological research makes clear that ethical decision
making is highly situational, and depends on circumstantial pressures and
constraints. 50 Except in extreme cases, efforts to predict dishonesty,
deviance, or other misconduct based on past acts are notoriously inaccurate,
even by psychologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health experts.51
Untrained disciplinary officials and judges are unlikely to do better,
particularly when the factors contributing to non-professional misconduct
differ vastly from those encountered in lawyer-client relationships. But
many decision makers dismiss or discount the circumstances that
distinguish personal from professional misconduct.
A case in point involves Laura Beth Lamb. Trapped in an abusive
marriage, Lamb lost her law license for ten years after taking the bar exam
for her husband. 52 At the time of the exam, she was seven months pregnant
and suffering complications from chronic diabetes. Her husband, who had
previously failed two exams, had bouts of rage and depression during which
he threw heavy objects, and threatened to kill Lamb and her unborn child if
she did not take the test in his place. She agreed, disguised herself as her
husband, and scored ninth out of some 7,000 applicants. After an
anonymous tip revealed the matter to the state bar, she pleaded guilty to
felony impersonation and deception. She received a $2,500 fine, probation,
and a sentence of 200 hours of community service. When she was fired
from her job at the SEC, she took a position as a legal secretary. She also
48. ABA, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 26–28 (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/regulation/standards_sanctions.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
49. See infra notes 52–64 and accompanying text.
50. See generally JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER (2002); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE
LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007); Gilbert Harman,
Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution
Error, 99 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 315 (1999); Walter Mischel & Yuichi Shoda, A
Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality:
Reconceptualizing Situations,
Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 246
(1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J.
491, 557–59 (1985); Alice Woolley, Tending the Bar: The “Good Character” Requirement
for Law Society Admission, 30 DALHOUSIE L.J. 27 (2007).
51. See Rhode, supra note 50, at 558–59 (citing sources).
52. In re Lamb, 776 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1989).
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divorced her husband and received psychological treatment. Despite her
therapist’s conclusion that Lamb “was unlikely to ‘do anything remotely
like this again,’” the California Supreme Court reasoned that her deceitful
acts were of “exceptional gravity” and warranted disbarment. 53 In the
court’s view, the “legal, ethical, and moral pressures of daily practice come
in many forms. Besides raw avarice and self-aggrandizement, they may
include the sincere but misguided desire to please a persuasive or
overbearing client . . . .” 54 Yet for the court to equate the pressure of an
insistent client to that of an abusive, mentally unstable spouse suggests a
profound insensitivity to the risks of battering a pregnant woman. 55
In a recent Massachusetts case, another victim of domestic violence had
her license suspended for conduct unlikely to recur in any professional
setting. 56 Fawn Balliro, an assistant district attorney, was assaulted by a
man in Tennessee with whom she was romantically involved. A neighbor
alerted the police, which led to misdemeanor assault charges. The
defendant pressured Balliro to drop the charges because he was on
probation for drug offenses, and if he was convicted, he would be
incarcerated and no one would be available to support his two minor
daughters. Balliro was unsuccessful in preventing the prosecution, and
when called as a witness, testified falsely that her injuries occurred while
falling. The case was dismissed, and the Tennessee prosecutor informed
the Massachusetts District Attorney’s Office that employed her of the
suspected perjury. The Office put Balliro on leave until she agreed to
undergo counseling and report her conduct to disciplinary authorities. She
did so, and the bar recommended a public reprimand, partly on the basis of
psychiatric testimony indicating that she was highly unlikely to commit
such an act again. 57 The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however,
concluded that false testimony under oath could not be condoned,
“irrespective of the circumstances,” and suspended her from practice for six
months. 58 In so ruling, the court noted the perceived inequity of giving her
a greater penalty than the two-month suspension previously imposed on a
lawyer who had assaulted his estranged wife. 59 In the justices’ view,
however, lying under oath was a more serious offense than battery, despite
the mitigating circumstances.
In most published decisions involving non-professional conduct, courts
do not even bother to consider the likelihood of its replication in a
professional relationship. It is enough that the conduct threatens the
53. Id. at 767–68.
54. Id. at 769.
55. See PAN-AM. HEALTH ORG., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DURING PREGNANCY 1–2 (2000),
available at http://www.planetwire.org/files.fcgi/2368_violencepregnancy.PDF; Loraine
Bacchus et al., Domestic Violence: Prevalence in Pregnant Women and Associations with
Physical and Psychological Health, 113 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY &
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 6, 6 (2004).
56. In re Balliro, 899 N.E.2d 794, 805 (Mass. 2009).
57. Id. at 796–98.
58. Id. at 804.
59. Id. at 804–05 (citing In re Grella, 777 N.E.2d 167 (Mass. 2002)).
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reputation of the profession. A representative example involves Albert
Boudreau, a Louisiana lawyer convicted of importing several magazines,
and a video, of child pornography. 60 Boudreau purchased the items in the
Netherlands, where the magazines were lawful and the models were of legal
age to be photographed nude. They were underage by American
definitions, however. 61 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the
disciplinary board that the actions constituted a “stain upon the legal
profession,” and clearly reflected on the lawyer’s “moral fitness to practice
law.” 62 Despite the absence of any prior disciplinary record, or any
relationship between personal and professional conduct, the court ordered
disbarment. 63
If the goal of such sanctions is to ensure public confidence, surely a
better strategy would be to make the oversight process more responsive to
professional misconduct, and less idiosyncratic in its responses to nonprofessional offenses. It can scarcely enhance respect for bar discipline
when lawyers guilty of such offenses receive wildly different treatment, and
the focus is professional reputation rather than public protection. Sanctions
for drug offenses, tax evasion, and domestic violence now range from
reprimand to disbarment, and decision makers often disagree about the
appropriate response in the same case. 64 As former Supreme Court Justice
Robert H. Jackson noted in a related context, a standard like moral
turpitude, which permits decisions to turn on reactions of “particular judges
to particular offenses,” invites caprice and clichés.65 Surely a profession
concerned about the legitimacy of its own regulation should aspire to do
better.

60. In re Boudreau, 815 So. 2d 76, 76 (La. 2002).
61. Id. at 78.
62. Id. at 78–79.
63. Id. at 79–80.
64. For drugs, see Florida Bar v. Liberman, 43 So. 3d 36, 37 (Fla. 2010) (disbarment for
supplying friends with small amounts of methamphetamine and Ecstasy); In re Lewis, 651
S.E.2d 729, 730 (Ga. 2007) (two-year suspension for possession of cocaine); In re Vegter,
835 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2005) (public reprimand for marijuana possession); State ex rel. Okla.
Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 246 P.3d 1090, 1095 (Okla. 2011) (public censure and one-year deferred
suspension); Brian K. Pinaire et al., Barred from the Bar: The Process, Politics, and Policy
Implications of Discipline for Attorney Felony Offenders, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 290,
319 (2006). For tax evasion, see Pinaire et al., supra, at 319; Tax Evasion Aggravated by
High Lifestyle Nets Year-Long Suspension for Two Lawyers, 26 LAW. MANUAL PROF.
CONDUCT 14 (2010). For domestic violence, see Ignascio G. Camarena II, Comment,
Domestically Violent Attorneys: Resuscitating and Transforming a Dusty, Old Punitive
Approach to Attorney Discipline into a Viable Prescription for Rehabilitation, 31 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 155, 173 (2001). For an illustration of disagreements on the same facts, see
In re Lever, 869 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524, 528 (App. Div. 2008), which involved an associate who
used his office computer to solicit sex by pretending to be a thirteen-year-old girl. The
referee recommended a six-month suspension; the court imposed a three-year suspension,
and two judges voted to disbar him.
65. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 239 (1951) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
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II. THE CANADIAN DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
A. Overview and Critiques
Provincial law societies regulate Canadian lawyers. As independent
administrative agencies exercising jurisdiction granted by statute, these
societies determine the standards for admission and discipline, as well as
investigate and sanction lawyer misconduct.66 Law societies also exercise
various other regulatory powers, such as mandating continuing legal
education, conducting practice audits, establishing trust accounting rules,
and governing the insurance plans to which all Canadian lawyers must
belong. Somewhat unusually for a Canadian independent administrative
agency, law societies also have rulemaking authority. 67
The law societies’ governing statutes direct them to “uphold and protect
the public interest in the administration of justice”; many also call on them
to “uphold and protect the interests of [their] members.” 68 “Benchers”
elected from members of the profession govern each law society, along with
a small number of appointed “lay” benchers.69 Disciplinary decisions—
about whether misconduct has occurred and what should be the appropriate
sanction—are made by a panel of benchers. They are usually unpaid. 70
In recent years, the law societies have increased their efforts to work
together to adopt national strategies on questions of professional ethics and
conduct. The Federation of Law Societies (Federation), an informal
umbrella organization with representatives from each law society, has
undertaken initiatives to require accreditation of Canadian common-law law
schools, to facilitate mobility of lawyers between the provinces, and to
develop a national code of conduct. 71 Although the accreditation and
national code initiatives are still ongoing, they seem likely to succeed in
significant part. 72 Neither the law societies nor the Federation undertake
lobbying or similar activities; representation and advocacy for the
profession are matters for the Canadian Bar Association.

66. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8 (Can.); Legal Profession Act,
S.B.C. 1998, c. 9 (Can.); Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8 (Can.); Professional Code,
R.S.Q., c. C-26 (Can.).
67. See Legal Profession Act, S.S. 1990, c. L-10.1, s. 10 (Can.); Legal Professions Act,
S.N.S. 2004, c. 28, s. 5(8) (Can.).
68. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, s. 3 (Can.). In British Columbia
the power to act in the interests of the profession is subordinate to the public interest. Id.
That is not the case in some of the other provinces. For example, the Law Society of Alberta
has the power to sanction any conduct that harms the reputation of the profession. See Legal
Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, s. 49 (Can.).
69. In Alberta, the power to appoint is vested in the Minister of Justice. See Legal
Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, s. 11 (Can.). In Ontario, it is the Lieutenant-Governor
in Council. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-8, s. 1 (Can.).
70. The exception to this is Ontario, where benchers are compensated in some
circumstances.
71. See National Regulatory Initiatives, FED’N L. SOC’YS CAN., http://www.flsc.ca/en/
national-standards/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
72. The accreditation program is relatively modest compared to the U.S. system, and
many provinces are revising the code prior to adoption.
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This structure gives the Canadian bar considerable autonomy; indeed,
Canada may be the “last bastion of unfettered self-regulation of the legal
profession in the common law world,” given that Australia, New Zealand,
England and Wales, and other common law countries have significantly
increased the role of non-lawyers in regulating the profession, and the
United States has always involved state courts in the disciplinary process.73
Canadian courts do exercise limited regulatory authority over lawyers
through their inherent jurisdiction to control their own processes. That
authority includes imposing costs on lawyers personally for unethical
conduct, establishing the law on conflicts and privilege, and otherwise
controlling the conduct of litigation before the courts. 74 This judicial
authority is distinct, however, from the power of the law societies, and is
subject to significant constraints. Courts cannot suspend or disbar lawyers,
cannot impose consequences for patterns of conduct, and cannot sanction
conduct that occurs outside of the litigation context.75 Although other
regulatory bodies—such as securities commissions—have the power to
impose practice requirements, this authority as yet has had little substantive
impact on Canadian lawyers’ ethical and legal obligations. 76
Like their American counterparts, the Canadian law societies have been
subject to significant criticism. Harry Arthurs characterizes Canadian
lawyer regulation as reflecting an “ethical economy,” in which law societies
focus disciplinary attention on marginal members of the profession who
have engaged in obviously immoral conduct or who have violated the
regulatory requirements imposed by the law societies. Arthurs suggests that
law society discipline “reflects a tendency to allocate its scarce resources of
staff time, public credibility and internal political consensus to those
disciplinary problems whose resolution provides the highest returns to the
profession with the least risk of adverse consequences.” 77 High-reward
discipline cases are those that enhance “public goodwill or professional

73. See ALICE WOOLLEY, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN CANADA 4, 4–9 (2011).
74. See, e.g., R. v. Neil, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631 (Can.) (establishing a rule for duty of
loyalty); Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 45 (Can.) (establishing a rule for solicitor-client
privilege); Walsh v. 1124660 Ontario Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 4069, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 755
(Can. Ont. S.C.J.) (imposing costs of litigation on the defendant lawyer); MacIntyre v.
Dickie, [1996] O.J. No. 1336 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (imposing costs of discovery on the
defendant lawyer); WOOLLEY, supra note 73, chs. 5, 8; Adam M. Dodek, The Public Safety
Exception to Solicitor-Client Privilege: Smith v. Jones, 34 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 293,
293–94 (2001).
75. The exception is the taxation power—any lawyer account can be taxed, whether or
not related to litigation.
76. See, e.g., Wilder v. Ontario Sec. Comm’n, [2001] O.J. No. 1017, 53 O.R. (3d) 519
(Can. Ont. C.A.).
77. Harry W. Arthurs, Why Canadian Law Schools Do Not Teach Legal Ethics, in
ETHICAL CHALLENGES TO LEGAL EDUCATION AND CONDUCT 105, 112 (Kim Economides et al.
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Arthurs, Canadian Law Schools]; see also Harry W. Arthurs et al.,
Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON
LAW WORLD 123–85 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); H.W. Arthurs, The
Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?, 33 ALTA. L. REV.
800, 801–02 (1995).
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solidarity”; high-risk discipline cases are those that diminish them.78
Arthurs notes that most lawyers who get disbarred are guilty of
misappropriation of client funds or other obvious wrongdoing, or have
shown themselves unwilling to respect law society authority; very few
lawyers are disciplined for incompetence or other more ambiguous types of
Further, disciplinary sanctions tend to
professional misconduct. 79
disproportionately target lawyers in solo practice or small partnerships.
This may be in part because those lawyers engage in higher risk types of
practice (such as conveyancing) or lack “collegial supports and controls,”
but also, more disturbingly, may be because they are at the margins of the
profession in power and status. 80 A review of law society decisions
confirms Arthurs’s characterization. In 2009, for example, most lawyers
were sanctioned for obviously immoral conduct or for defying the
regulatory authority of the law societies, and most lawyers brought before
the law society practiced alone or in a firm of fewer than ten lawyers. 81
Other critics of law societies identify a wide range of failures. These
include: ineffective regulation of competence; lack of performance
standards for lawyers undertaking particular tasks; lack of adequate (or any,
in some jurisdictions) regulation of law firms; insufficient responses to
unethical billing; inattention to inequities in access to justice; excessive
concern with professional reputation; and mishandling of specific cases.82
After citing ten failures in law societies’ responses to issues such as
disclosure of imminent financial harm, competence, sexual relations
between lawyers and clients, continuing legal education, fees, pro bono, and
self-regulation, Richard Devlin and Porter Heffernan noted:
Our point . . . is not to immediately proclaim “regulatory failure” or
suggest that self-regulation is irremediably unsalvageable. Rather,
our purpose is to indicate that the current Canadian complacency
[about lawyer regulation] is unwarranted. At every level of the
regulatory regime—establishing standards, monitoring conduct,
and enforcing penalties—there appears to be serious problems that

78. Arthurs, Canadian Law Schools, supra note 77, at 112.
79. Id. at 113.
80. Id. at 115.
81. See Alice Woolley, Regulation in Practice, 15 LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1976090.
82. Richard F. Devlin & Porter Heffernan, The End(s) of Self-Regulation?, 45 ALTA. L.
REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 169 (2008); Adam M. Dodek, Regulating Large Law Firms
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1984635; Gavin MacKenzie, Regulating Lawyer Competence and Quality of Service, 45
ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 143, 150 (2008); Michael Trebilcock, Regulating the Market
for Legal Services, 45 ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 215, 224 (2008); Alice Woolley,
Ethics as Regulation: A Comment on Merchant v. Law Society of Saskatchewan, 72 SASK.
L. REV. 279, 290–92 (2009) [hereinafter Woolley, Ethics as Regulation]; Alice Woolley,
Time for Change: Unethical Hourly Billing in the Canadian Profession and What Should Be
Done About It, 83 CAN. B. REV. 859, 860–61 (2004) [hereinafter Woolley, Time for
Change]; Woolley, supra note 2, at 107–41.
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require us to question whether self-regulation is truly in the public
interest. 83
B. A Flawed Structure
Many of the reasons for the limited effectiveness of Canadian regulatory
processes match those identified in the American system. The most
significant barrier to effective bar oversight arises from the regulatory
structure itself. A province-based system has limited ability to access any
economies of scale. While the law society of Ontario can draw resources
(financial and personnel) from some 30,000 members, the law society of
Saskatchewan can draw from only 1,500; yet both law societies are
expected to offer the full range of regulatory oversight, and to respond to all
forms of lawyer misconduct. 84 Even in the larger provinces of Ontario and
Quebec, available resources may fall short of meeting regulatory needs.
Law societies have the broad and complex task of formulating as well as
enforcing regulatory policies. Yet these societies depend on modest
member dues to fund services, and on the (mostly volunteer) time of
lawyers to implement their regulatory agenda. 85 No other area of complex
economic activity in Canada relies so heavily on regulation through the
volunteer efforts and financial support of the group being regulated. It is
scarcely surprising that the system falls short.
These problems are compounded by a highly autonomous regulatory
structure. It may well be that any lawyer regulatory structure will be
vulnerable to capture by its subjects on at least some issues. 86 In the
Canadian system, however, no capture is necessary. Lawyers control every
aspect of the governance process, and have the statutory authority to
regulate in their own interests. No countervailing forces have a meaningful
voice. No elaborate conspiracy theory is required to suggest that such a
regulatory structure is likely to privilege professional over public interests,
and to focus attention on contexts where those interests align: clear moral
misconduct by the least powerful members of the bar.
As in the United States, consumers in Canada have not effectively
organized to demand a more effective oversight process. Despite the
widespread criticism by experts, the public has voiced almost no
comparable concerns. Even events that seem most likely to attract negative
publicity, such as exposure of a sexual relationship between the head of the
Law Society of Upper Canada (Ontario) and a vulnerable client, or the
conviction of the President of the Law Society of British Columbia on
charges related to drunk driving, have attracted relatively little public
83. Devlin & Heffernan, supra note 82, at 182.
84. Saskatchewan had to address the best-known legal ethics scandals of the last fifteen
years in Canada: the solicitation of clients and fee abuses by Anthony Merchant in relation
to the Indian residential schools litigation. Id. at 176–77.
85. As noted earlier, in most provinces benchers are not compensated; in Ontario, they
are paid once their time commitment reaches a certain level.
86. Duncan Webb, Are Lawyers Regulatable?, 45 ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 233,
253 (2008).
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attention and no suggestion that those events demonstrate regulatory
failure. 87 Although no evidence indicates that the public’s view of lawyers
is more positive in Canada than in other nations, any disenchantment with
the profession has not led to activism or calls for change.
The lack of consumer engagement may have multiple causes, including
the diffusion of regulation across the provinces; the absence of a prominent
role for lawyers in Canadian history or public life; and the inaccessibility of
information about lawyer misconduct and regulatory failures. Most law
society disciplinary decisions are publicly available through CanLII and in
addition, each law society provides statistics in its annual report about the
number of active and inactive lawyers in the province, the number of
complaints, and the imposition of serious sanctions. 88 No publicly
available information is available, however, on complaints that do not result
in sanctions, or about the number of complaints that have been made
against a lawyer. Although law societies issue ethics opinions to lawyers
who request them, the rulings are not available to other practitioners in any
readily accessible form.
In addition, the limited jurisdiction of the law societies leaves many
aggrieved parties without an effective remedy. Although the societies
normally respond to disciplinary matters only when brought to their
attention by complaints, generally from clients, these societies cannot
provide meaningful compensation. 89 The absence of such remedies
diminishes parties’ incentives to complain and, in turn, also diminishes the
profession’s opportunities to respond. A further problem is the failure of
Canadian academics and law schools to make lawyers’ ethical and
regulatory responsibilities a primary area of concern. In many Canadian
law schools, legal ethics has not been a required course. Despite recent
improvements, only a handful of Canadian legal academics work primarily
in the area of legal ethics, and only slightly more have written about the
87. Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Hunter, 2007 ONLSHP 27 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of B.C.
v. Berge, 2005 L.S.B.C. 28 (CanLII).
88. See CANLII, http://www.canlii.org; see also, e.g., LAW SOC’Y OF ALTA., ANNUAL
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2009), available at http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/files/financial/
Annual_Report_2009.pdf.
89. On occasion, law societies discover financial misconduct through the audit process.
In addition, the Law Society of Upper Canada has introduced a process for judges to make
complaints about lawyers that will result in mentoring rather than disciplinary proceedings.
This process is designed to ensure that judges are not deterred from reporting lawyers
because of concerns that the sanctions may be too severe. See Letter from Malcolm L. Heins,
CEO, Law Soc’y of Upper Can., to the Honourable Madam Justice Heather Forster Smith,
Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/
mar3110_scj_protocol.pdf. As in the United States, lawyers have an ethical obligation to
report misconduct by other lawyers, but this obligation is generally not fulfilled, and lawyers
who do complain about other counsel may be perceived as doing so for strategic or tactical
reasons. The Law Society of Upper Canada has some ability to order lawyers to repay fees
to a client or contribute to a general compensation fund. See Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. L.8, parts 13 & 14 (Can.). Some law societies will undertake fee arbitration between
lawyers and clients. See, e.g., LAW SOC’Y OF MAN., CONCERNS ABOUT YOUR LAWYER,
http://www.lawsociety.mb.ca/for-the-public/concerns-about-your-lawyer#fees (last visited
Apr. 21, 2012).
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subject at all. 90 This absence of scholarly interest restricts the information
available to the public concerning problems in oversight processes.
This is not to impugn the good faith efforts by law societies to live up to
their regulatory responsibilities. But it is to underscore the structural and
resource limitations that keep those efforts focused on egregious or readily
proved misconduct, and that leave many problems unaddressed.
Competence, counseling, fees, litigation conduct, and lawyering in large
firms frequently fall outside law society oversight.
C. Regulation of Character
Although a great deal of lawyers’ professional conduct remains insulated
from regulatory attention, their personal behavior is a common focus of bar
discipline. Law societies do not hesitate to sanction lawyers convicted of
crimes unrelated to legal practice, even where there is no reason to believe
that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct or is at risk of doing
so.
As in the United States, this willingness may be partly attributable to the
lack of evidentiary problems and to the morally distasteful nature of the
lawyer’s misconduct. 91 And, as noted earlier, many law societies have
express authority to regulate in the interests of the profession, which
includes maintaining lawyers’ reputations in the eye of the public.92
In one recent example, the Law Society of Upper Canada (Ontario)
considered the conduct of a nationally prominent energy lawyer who was
convicted of sexual exploitation of two girls between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen. The lawyer was a friend of the girls’ family, the relationships
were consensual, and the girls retained a positive attitude toward the

90. See, e.g., Adam M. Dodek, Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of
Scholarship, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 115 (2000). For improvements, see Adam M. Dodek,
Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
1 (2008). More scholars teach in the area than write in it. With the Federation of Law
Societies’s new requirement that every common-law law school teach legal ethics, it may be
that—as happened following the ABA’s requirement of a mandatory law school course—
legal ethics will become a more active area of legal scholarship.
91. The criminal conviction proves the case, and the lawyer has no right to re-argue it in
a different setting. Toronto v. Canadian Union of Pub. Emps., Local 79, [2003] S.C.R. 77
(Can.).
92. See, e.g., Legal Professions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, s. 49(1) (Can.) (defining the
power of the Law Society to discipline matters whether or not occurring within the lawyer’s
practice, and either in the best interests of the public or of the profession). In Ontario, Rule
1.02 of the Rules of Professional Conduct defines “conduct unbecoming” as conduct “in a
lawyer’s personal or private capacity, that tends to bring discredit upon the legal profession.”
LAW SOC’Y OF UPPER CAN., RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1 (2000). For examples of reliance
on protecting the profession’s reputation, see Law Soc’y of Man. v. Dolovich, 2010 MBLS
11 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Horgan, [2010] L.S.D.D. No. 14, paras. 14–15
(Can.); Law Soc’y of B.C. v. Berge, 2005 LSBC 28, paras. 83–87 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of
B.C. v. Rodgers, 2005 LSBC 42, para. 9 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Mills, 2005
ONLSHP 5, para. 30 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Johnston, [2003] L.S.D.D. No.
21, para. 37 (Can.); Law Soc’y of Man. v. Bjornson, [1996] L.S.D.D. No. 258 (Can.); Law
Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Morra, [1995] L.S.D.D. No. 171, para. 26 (Can.).

2012]

PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYER REGULATION

2779

lawyer, even after his criminal conviction. 93 According to the trial judge,
they were not “‘true victims’ in the ordinary sense of the word” and were
“not seriously negatively impacted by their overall relationship with the
accused.” 94 The trial judge nonetheless sentenced the lawyer to a brief
period of incarceration based on his breach of trust. In disciplinary
proceedings, an expert testified that the lawyer was extremely unlikely to
re-offend; there was no evidence to suggest misconduct in the lawyer’s
professional life. 95 One of the girls wrote a letter expressing her support
and sympathy for the lawyer. Nonetheless, the Law Society revoked his
license to practice based on the seriousness of his breach of trust, the need
to deter similar conduct, and the importance of ensuring public confidence
in the legal profession. The Society stated:
The issue of general deterrence is an important factor by itself, but it also
has a connection to the maintenance of the standing and integrity of
lawyers before the public. . . . In our view, general deterrence of lawyers
from engaging in exploitative sexual behaviour, and maintaining the
public’s confidence in the status of lawyers and their entitlement to
practise as a self-regulating profession, are two sides of the same coin. 96

Yet for reasons noted earlier, the normative and empirical foundations for
this focus on reputational concerns are weak. 97 No evidence suggests that
sanctioning non-professional conduct is an effective way of promoting
public confidence. More attention to lawyers’ misconduct in professional
settings might better safeguard the image of attorneys and the credibility of
regulatory processes. A more defensible justification for sanctions based on
lawyers’ personal conduct is that personal misconduct is predictive of
future professional conduct. This rationale is most plausible when the
actions closely relate to the lawyer’s legal practice, or arise from
opportunities afforded by the lawyer’s practice.98 But in many contexts,
such as the one reflected in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Budd, the
relationship is highly attenuated, and the empirical evidence summarized
earlier underscores the impossibility of accurately predicting future moral
behavior based on conduct occurring in different factual circumstances.99
Law societies generally take no account of such evidence, and expect that
the public will assume a connection between personal and professional
conduct.

93. Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Budd, [2009] L.S.D.D. No. 141, para. 6 (Can.).
94. Id. at paras. 16–17.
95. Id. at para. 58.
96. Id. at paras. 86–87.
97. See generally Alice Woolley, Legal Ethics and Regulatory Legitimacy: Regulating
Lawyers for Personal Misconduct, in ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL
ETHICS: REIMAGINING THE PROFESSION 241 (Francesca Bartlett et al. eds., 2011).
98. In Law Society of Upper Canada v. Johnston, [2003] L.S.D.D. No. 21 (Can.), a
Crown attorney was prosecuted for paying for sexual services from a minor. He had met at
least one of the women he solicited in his capacity as a Crown attorney. Again, while this
was not conduct arising in his legal practice, it was a clear abuse of an opportunity provided
by his practice, and sanctioned as such. Id. at paras. 10, 32.
99. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
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For example, in Law Society of Manitoba v. Dolovich, the Law Society
justified the disbarment of a lawyer convicted of possessing and distributing
child pornography on the basis that his disrespect for law would make him
untrustworthy in the eyes of the public. 100
The concern raised by Mr. Dolovich’s convictions of possession
and distribution of child pornography is not that he is medically or
psychologically unfit to practice law. Rather, the concern is that
neither the public nor Mr. Dolovich’s fellow lawyers can have any
confidence or trust in him to represent citizens in legal matters or
to research and explain legal issues when his conduct reveals such
a profound lack of respect for the laws of this country. 101
Other decision makers have similarly suggested that personal misconduct
can so “shatter . . . [a lawyer’s] professional integrity” that public trust will
be impossible. 102 In effect, these assertions simply restate the argument
based on professional reputation in different terms.
Yet the concern with public image is not always consistent. Law Society
of Upper Canada v. Tassy involved a lawyer who had developed a
somewhat pathological attitude towards cyclists.103 On three different
occasions he was convicted of assaulting bicycle riders, which he defended
as a response to the cyclists’ “discourteous and dangerous” acts.104 The bar
hearing panel raised the possibility that Tassy might have a mental illness
and recommended a reprimand if he could provide a psychiatric report
indicating his fitness to practice law. He did so and received only that
sanction. Although that result does not seem unreasonable, it is hard to
reconcile with other Law Society rulings. Decision makers concerned with
professional reputation might be reluctant to be so lenient with a seemingly
unstable lawyer who assaulted three cyclists, one of them a child, and
showed no remorse. But if, as the result in Tassy suggests, the primary goal
should be public protection, which is assured by a psychiatric affidavit
concerning fitness, why is this approach not appropriate in other cases like
Budd or Dolovich?
As these cases suggest, decision making on personal conduct is as
inconsistent in Canada as in the United States. Canadian lawyers can be
disbarred for conduct far removed from practice, as in Budd or Dolovich,
but only reprimanded or fined for conduct that is equally serious or more
closely related to practice, such as violating a court order and committing
assault, 105 threatening someone with a weapon, 106 evading taxes, 107 lying

100. See Law Soc’y of Man. v. Dolovich, 2010 MBLS 11 (CanLII).
101. Id.
102. Cwinn v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 108 D.L.R. 3d 381, para. 10 (Can. Ont. Div.
Ct.).
103. Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Tassy, [1997] L.S.D.D. No. 46 (Can.).
104. Id. In two cases, he hit them with a walking stick. Id. at para 18. In another case, he
shoved a young boy and the boy’s older sister. Id. at para. 28.
105. See Law Soc’y of Man. v. Bjornson, [1996] L.S.D.D. No. 258 (Can.).
106. See Law Soc’y of B.C. v. Rodgers, [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 125 (Can.).
107. See Law Soc’y of Man. v. Ament, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 150 (Can.).
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to the police, 108 or committing fraud. 109 These varying results are partly
attributable to the broad range of factors that law societies can consider,
such as remorse, rehabilitation, and prior professional conduct.110
Although taking such factors into account may seem reasonable in
principle, when the practice is coupled with the subjective nature of
judgments, the concerns about public image, and the lack of empirical
foundations for predictions about future conduct, the results appear highly
idiosyncratic. Such a process is scarcely conducive to inspiring public
confidence.
III. ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY MODELS
Other countries with legal systems comparable to the United States and
Canada have moved in a direction of greater responsiveness to consumer
concerns, and could serve as appropriate models for reform. These
countries have established co-regulatory structures in which the bar shares
authority with other, more publicly accountable entities. Although
systematic research will be necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of these
reforms, their frameworks hold promise for dealing with the structural
problems that have plagued the United States and Canadian systems.
A. Consumer-Oriented Reforms
Traditionally, barristers and solicitors in England and Wales were
governed by their own professional societies, which performed both
representational and regulatory functions. In 2007, after widespread
criticism and review, Parliament enacted a new Legal Services Act that
identifies “protecting and promoting the interests of consumers” as one of
its key objectives. 111 The Act establishes an independent Legal Services
Board that has responsibility for oversight of legal services in England and
Wales, with a majority of lay members and a lay chair. The Board approves
a frontline regulator for each class of licensed legal providers. The
approved regulators retain disciplinary responsibility for complaints that
allege serious professional misconduct, but must create a largely
independent body to exercise oversight. 112 In addition, the governance
body of the largest regulator, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, will by
2013 have a majority of lay members. 113 If an approved regulator is too
slow or ineffective in exercising its authority, the Board may fine the
regulator, make remedial orders, or withdraw its oversight powers. 114

108. See Law Soc’y of N.W.T. v. McCauley, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 213 (Can.).
109. See Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Reid, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 27 (Can.).
110. See, e.g., Law Soc’y of Man. v. Ament, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 150 (Can.).
111. Legal Services Act of 2007, c. 29, § 1(d) (Eng.).
112. Id. § 4. The approved regulator for solicitors is the Law Society of England and
Wales, and disciplinary jurisdiction rests with the Solicitors Regulation Authority.
113. See LAW SOC’Y GEN. REGS., § 14(6) (2008), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/
documents/downloads/generalregulations.pdf.
114. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 27.
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Less serious complaints involving performance issues are addressed by
the Legal Ombudsman, created by the Office for Legal Complaints, and
subject to the authority of the Legal Services Board. 115 The Ombudsman
determines an outcome between the lawyer and the client that is “fair and
reasonable,” taking into account how a court would perceive the
relationship between the lawyer and client, the applicable rules of conduct,
and what the “ombudsman considers to have been good practice at the time
of the act/omission.” 116 The Ombudsman may require the lawyer to
apologize, refund or waive fees, or pay compensation up to £30,000 for
financial losses or “inconvenience/distress,” and may also take action to put
right “any specified error, omission or other deficiency.” 117
Parties with complaints must first approach lawyers to seek resolution
within a given period set by a statute of limitations.118 If unsuccessful, they
may then approach the Ombudsman, who must resolve any grievances in
accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness, including a
hearing where appropriate. 119 The Legal Ombudsman may dismiss a
complaint if he or she believes that it has no “reasonable prospect of
success” or is frivolous or vexatious; if the complainant did not suffer
“financial loss, distress, inconvenience or other detriment”; if the lawyer
already offered “fair and reasonable redress”; if the matter would be more
appropriately dealt with by a court or “there are other compelling reasons
why it is inappropriate for the issue to be dealt with by the Legal
Ombudsman.” 120 The Legal Ombudsman also has other powers, such as
the authority to investigate, to advise a client that a related complaint could
have been brought against another lawyer or law firm, and, if the complaint
indicates professional misconduct, to advise the regulatory body responsible
for that lawyer. 121 Every time a complaint is made against a lawyer that is
not resolved in that lawyer’s favor, the lawyer must pay a £400 “case fee”
in addition to any other sanctions the Legal Ombudsman imposes.122
England and Wales have also authorized creation of alternative practice
structures that will allow non-lawyer ownership and will subject the entity
to regulatory oversight. 123 This new regime reflects a form of “principles-

115. See Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 (Eng.); LEGAL OMBUDSMAN, SCHEME RULES,
R. 2.1, 2.7, 2.8 (2011). The Ombudsman’s Scheme Rules are approved by the Legal
Services Board.
116. LEGAL OMBUDSMAN, supra note 115, at R. 5.37.
117. Id. at R. 5.38, 5.40, 5.43, 5.45.
118. Id. at R. 4.1, 4.4–4.8, 5.3.
119. Id. at R. 5.1–5.35
120. Id. at R. 5.7(a)–(c), (m).
121. Id. at R. 5.15, 5.19. The regulatory bodies in England are different for solicitors,
barristers, and other legal service providers. Id. at R. 1.2, 5.59.
122. Id. at Rules 6.3–6.4.
123. Press Release, Legal Servs. Bd., LSB Confirms October 2011 as Start Date for
Alternative
Business
Structures
(Feb.
23,
2010),
available
at
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/press_releases/2010/pdf/23022010
_abs_press_release.pdf.
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based regulation” that focuses on proactively improving performance, not
simply sanctioning violations after the fact. 124
In Australia, widely publicized scandals also prompted state governments
to create more accountable and consumer-oriented regulatory processes. In
2004, a Standing Committee of Attorneys General created Model
Provisions for the Legal Profession that eventually were translated into
Legal Profession Acts by all but one state and territory. 125 Although the
Acts vary in certain respects, they share a commitment to increased
transparency and responsiveness in oversight processes. For example, in
New South Wales, an Independent Legal Services Commissioner receives
all complaints and refers them either to consumer-oriented mediation or to
the bar’s own regulatory bodies. Complainants who are unsatisfied with the
results may seek review by the Commissioner, who has the power to
substitute a new decision. The Commissioner also oversees the process for
handling complaints and may take over a particular investigation or
recommend more general changes. 126 Queensland has an independent
Legal Services Commission headed by a non-lawyer. 127 Its disciplinary
system includes a Client Relations Center, which resolves minor disputes,
and a Legal Practice Tribunal, composed of a Supreme Court Justice, one
non-lawyer, and one practitioner. Problems of competence and diligence
can be subjects for discipline, and all disciplinary actions are published on
the Legal Service Commission website.128
Beginning with landmark 2001 legislation in New South Wales, all but
one Australian state and territory also allow “incorporated legal practices”
The
(ILPs), which permit ownership interests by non-lawyers. 129
regulatory framework for these incorporated legal practices serve as models
for regulatory innovation. Under this framework, ILPs must have at least
one practitioner director responsible for creating appropriate management
systems that ensure compliance with professional conduct rules. 130
124. See Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 195, 213 (2010).
125. See Bobette Wolski, Reform of the Civil Justice System 25 Years Past: (In)adequate
Responses from Law Schools and Professional Associations (And How Best to Change the
Behaviour of Lawyers), 40 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 40, 66–67 (2011).
126. See DAVID NICOLSON & JULIAN WEBB, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS 86 (1999);
CHRISTINE PARKER & ADRIAN EVANS, INSIDE LAWYER’S ETHICS 54–55 (2007); Deborah L.
Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: A Comparative Perspective on Access to Legal Services
and Accountability of the Legal Profession, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 93 (2003).
127. Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 591 (Austl.), available at
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/legisltn/current/l/legalproa07.pdf; Leslie C. Levin,
Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System: The Queensland Experience, 9 LEGAL ETHICS
187, 193–94 (2006); see also PARKER & EVANS, supra note 126, at 56.
128. See Levin, supra note 127, at 193; see also PARKER & EVANS, supra note 126, at 56.
129. See Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon, & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethics
Management: An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession in New South Wales, 37 J. L. & SOC’Y 466, 467 (2010); see also Legal Profession
Act 2007 (Qld) s 2.7 (Austl.), available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/legisltn/current/
l/legalproa07.pdf; John Briton & Scott McLean, Incorporated Legal Practices: Dragging
the Regulation of the Legal Profession into the Modern Era, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 241 (2010).
130. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 141 (Austl.).
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Directors who fail to take “all reasonable steps” available to meet their
obligations are subject to disciplinary sanctions.131 Legal Services
Commissioners also have authority to conduct a compliance audit of
practice management systems, whether or not a complaint has been filed.
In New South Wales, which has one of the most well-developed
oversight structures, ILP management systems must address ten objectives
relating to matters that often give rise to complaints, such as competence,
communications, supervision, trust funds, and conflicts of interest. 132 All
ILPs must conduct a self-audit to assess their compliance with each of these
objectives. 133 ILPs that rate themselves as not fully compliant must work
with the Office of the Legal Service Commissioner to improve their
practice management systems. 134 In cases where the ILP’s self-audit or
client complaints raise concerns, the Commissioner can initiate an
independent audit. 135 A comprehensive study of the New South Wales
framework found that requiring ILPs to go through the process of self
assessment resulted in frequent internal reforms and reduced the number of
complaints by about half. 136 Part of the success of the system is attributable
to the constructive non-adversarial working relationship that has developed
between the Commissioner and the ILPs subject to regulation.137
The same has been true in Queensland, which is now in the process of
developing external audit processes that will ensure adequate oversight
without overly intrusive or burdensome requirements. Among these
processes are web-based surveys of ILP practitioners and staff concerning
matters such as ethical culture, billing practices, and complaint management
systems. 138 Results will enable the ILPs to benchmark their performance
against that of peers, and will help the Commissioner assess the
effectiveness of different regulatory processes.
Success with this
framework could lead to adoption for traditional firms as well as those with
alternative practice structures. 139
B. Non-professional Conduct
Whether the new consumer focus will alter how courts and disciplinary
agencies treat conduct occurring outside professional relationships is
unclear. Traditionally, Australian decisions reflected much the same
inconsistency apparent in the United States and Canada. So, for example,
one 2002 ruling disbarred a practitioner guilty of sexual offenses against a
minor on the ground that “[t]he public would rightly doubt the standards of
a profession which permitted a person who has recently committed such
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Briton & McLean, supra note 129, at 244.
See Parker, Gordon, & Mark, supra note 129, at 472.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 493.
See id.; see also Briton & McLean, supra note 129, at 248–49.
See Briton & McLean, supra note 129, at 250–51.
See id. at 253.
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serious offenses to remain one of its members.” 140 By contrast, a year later,
another court declined to disbar a lawyer guilty of trafficking in cocaine.141
Because bar oversight authority comes from the legislature, however, it is
subject to some democratic accountability, and reputation of the profession
is now no longer identified as a relevant consideration in imposing
sanctions. 142 The trend of recent decisions is to focus on the seriousness of
the offense and whether it involves dishonesty. 143
One widely reported 2004 New South Wales decision is emblematic of
the continuing division of views among Australian judges concerning
non-professional misconduct. It involved a solicitor convicted of lewd
conduct toward the children of a woman who later forgave and married
him. The solicitor failed to disclose to prospective legal employers those
convictions and another that had been reversed on appeal.144 Although the
Court of Appeals ordered disbarment, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the conduct surrounding the solicitor’s breach of trust was “so remote from
anything to do with professional practice that the characterisation of the
appellant’s personal misconduct as professional misconduct was
erroneous.” 145 Because the solicitor had already lost his license for five
years while the case was pending, the court believed that no further sanction
was appropriate.
England and Wales, however, show no signs of departure from their
traditional approach, which permits sanctions for conduct that could impair
the profession’s reputation. The 2007 Solicitors’ Code of Conduct requires
practitioners to avoid any conduct “within or outside [their] professional
practice which undermines [public] trust.” 146 The Code of Conduct for
barristers similarly requires that they not engage in conduct likely to
“diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of
justice or otherwise bring the profession into disrepute.” 147 To some
tribunals, a criminal conviction seems almost by definition to justify
striking a practitioner from the roles in order to “maintain the reputation of
the profession” and “sustain the public confidence.” 148 In cases involving
matters such as drugs, sex, or driving while intoxicated, disbarment is
ordered without any discussion of the nexus between personal and
professional misconduct; the decision simply lists the offenses and declares
140. Law Soc’y of S. Austl. v Rodda [2002] SASC 274 ¶ 29 (Austl.)
141. Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of N.S.W. v P [2003] NSWCA 320 (Austl.). For
other cases, see Duncan Webb, Nefarious Conduct and the ‘Fit and Proper Person Test,’ in
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS: REIMAGINING THE
PROFESSION, supra note 97, at 218–40.
142. See id. at 222.
143. See id.
144. A Solicitor v Council of the Law Soc’y of N.S.W. [2004] HCA 1 (Austl.).
145. Id. ¶ 34; see also Webb, supra note 141, at 224.
146. SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., SOLICITORS’ CODE OF CONDUCT 2007, R. 1.06
(2007).
147. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES ¶ 301(a)(iii) (8th ed. 2004).
148. Law Soc’y v. Gilbert, [2000] All E.R. (d) 1891 (Eng.). Although that case involved
professional misconduct, the court’s decision to increase the sanction following a criminal
conviction is reflective of the priority placed on professional reputation.
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them “discreditable” and likely to “bring the profession into disrepute.”149
Unlike recent regulatory reforms concerning professional misconduct, the
focus in non-professional discipline seems to be on public image, not public
protection.
IV. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
To what extent the United States and Canada might follow England and
Australia’s lead in consumer-oriented reforms is by no means clear. As Ted
Schneyer notes, the changes in those countries were largely attributable to
powerful consumer groups with government allies, including antitrust
regulators. 150 In the United States and Canada, as discussed earlier, such
pressures are largely absent. American antitrust law has not generally been
invoked to challenge state court rules, and the inherent powers doctrine
limits legislative intervention on bar regulatory matters. 151 American
courts have, however, tolerated legislative and administrative regulation
that they consider consistent with their authority. 152 Some courts might be
willing to implement reforms along the lines that England and Australia
have pioneered, if structured in ways that did not challenge the judiciary’s
ultimate authority. To the extent that the Australian model of regulating
ILP demonstrates success in reducing complaints through a cooperative,
problem solving, rather than adversarial, approach, some bar associations
might be willing to adopt similar frameworks. Greater transparency in
decisions concerning non-professional misconduct might also persuade bar
associations and courts to adopt standards promoting greater consistency.
In Canada, no structural barriers prevent reform along the lines adopted
in Australia and in England and Wales. Although the lack of public
149. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES ¶ 301(a)(i), (a)(iii); see BAR
STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS:
SIMON AUSTIN HAMILTON (2009),
http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-professional-conduct/disciplinarytribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/?DisciplineID=74852
(child
pornography,
public indecency); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS: NICOLA JANE MARSHALL
(2008),
http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-professional-conduct/
disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/?DisciplineID=74836
(driving
while intoxicated, failure to stop after accident); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY
FINDINGS: AMIR HASSAN MODJIRI (2007), http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaintsand-professional-conduct/disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/
?DisciplineID=74803 (cocaine possession); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS:
RUPERT JOHN MASSEY (2006), http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-andprofessional-conduct/disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/
?DisciplineID=74742 (indecent assault on a male); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY
FINDINGS: JOHN PAUL TEMPLE (2006), http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaintsand-professional-conduct/disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/
?DisciplineID=74757 (child pornography).
150. Schneyer, supra note 20, at 24.
151. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789 & n.18 (1975); see also supra notes
11–16, 42–45 and accompanying text. For infrequent antitrust action, see Terry, supra note
42, at 200–02.
152. See Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 156
(2010); Charles Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation: The Role of the Inherent
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. L.J. 1, 6–13 (1989). For the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness
to tolerate congressional regulation, see Barton, supra note 12, at 1211–12.
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concern about the weaknesses in lawyer regulation may inhibit fundamental
changes, some incremental progress may be possible through shifts in law
society practice or through legislative amendments to the authorizing
statutes under which those law societies operate.
A. Proposals for the United States
A more effective disciplinary process in the United States would expand
its oversight and remedial approaches concerning professional performance,
and narrow its concern with non-professional offenses. The jurisdiction of
disciplinary agencies should be broadened to include neglect, negligence,
and fees, and resources should be increased to ensure adequate investigation
and remedial responses. Rather than relying almost exclusively on client
complaints (supplemented by felony convictions), regulatory officials
should initiate investigations based on judicial sanctions and self-audits.
More effort should be made to insulate regulatory agencies from
professional pressures and to develop cost-effective dispute resolution
processes for minor misconduct. A co-regulatory structure along the lines
developed for Australia, England, and Wales could include a lay
ombudsman with responsibility to mediate disputes, review dismissed
cases, and make periodic reports to the courts concerning the performance
of the regulatory process. Lawyers should be required to carry malpractice
insurance and remedies should include client compensation. Support
services and diversion programs for lawyers with mental health, substance
abuse, office management, and short-term financial difficulties should help
these practitioners establish an appropriate remedial plan and supervise
their compliance. 153 More efforts should also be made to track the
effectiveness of these programs and to deal with recidivists.
The process also needs to become more transparent. Lawyers should be
required to provide information to clients or to centralized databanks
concerning their disciplinary and malpractice records. 154 Four-fifths of
surveyed Americans express a desire for such resources, and replicable
Disciplinary
models involving physicians are widely available.155
complaints should also be made public if the relevant oversight body finds
probable cause for investigation. Although lawyers have generally opposed
this proposal on the ground that disclosure of unfounded complaints would
unjustly prejudice their reputations, no evidence has demonstrated those
harms in the minority of states with open processes. If civil complaints and
police arrests are matters of public record, it is not clear why grievances
against lawyers should be subject to special protection. 156 Because
consumer surveys find deep suspicion about closed door proceedings, even
153. See ABEL, supra note 5, at 512–14; RHODE, supra note 6, at 163–64; Diane M. Ellis,
A Decade of Diversion: Empirical Evidence that Alternative Discipline Is Working for
Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1221 (2003).
154. See ABEL, supra note 5, at 514; RHODE, supra note 6, at 162–63.
155. See Steven K. Berenson, Is It Time for Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 645,
651–57, 680 (2001). For these and other reforms, see RHODE, supra note 6, at 162–65.
156. See Levin, supra note 34, at 21–22.
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the ABA’s own disciplinary commission has recommended disclosure of
non-frivolous complaints. 157
Concerns of public protection should also figure more prominently in the
review of non-professional misconduct. Given the difficulties of predicting
future offenses from unrelated past misconduct, the most empirically
defensible approach would be to limit bar oversight to matters involving
fraud, dishonesty, and other acts relevant to professional work. 158 If that
limitation is politically implausible, another possibility would be to
establish guidelines for the treatment of specified offenses, modeled on
standards applicable in other licensing contexts subject to legislative
oversight. At the very least, the profession should strive for more
consistent treatment of similar conduct, and should avoid duplicating
criminal sanctions for largely reputational objectives.
B. Proposals for Canada
To achieve a truly efficient and effective regulatory system in Canada
will require structural changes. 159 Although it is unrealistic to expect that
oversight could be moved from the provinces to the federal government, it
does seem possible to reduce the autonomy of the law societies and their
dependence on volunteers. 160
While investigation and prosecution
functions could remain within the law societies, a separate tribunal should
be established to adjudicate disciplinary cases. That tribunal could also
mediate lawyer-client disputes, much as the Legal Ombudsman does in
England and Wales. Oversight should be expanded to address performance
concerns that fall short of professional misconduct, and to provide remedies
for clients.
Tribunal members could be paid and appointed by a joint committee of
the chief justices of the provincial court of appeal and trial courts, and the
elected and lay benchers of the law society. This appointment process
should be designed to ensure some diversity in members’ backgrounds and
some professional independence and public accountability for their
performance. Most complaints involving client services could be brought
directly by the aggrieved party, although the law society should have the
option of intervening in a case where it believes appropriate.

157. ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 33 (1992); Levin, supra note 34, at 22.
158. See, e.g., Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Keele, 795 N.W.2d 507, 513–14 (Iowa 2009)
(refusing to discipline a lawyer for illegal possession of a firearm where there was no nexus
between that offense and his ability to function as a lawyer).
159. These suggestions, and their normative underpinnings, are discussed further in Alice
Woolley, Rhetoric and Realities: What Independence of the Bar Requires of Lawyer
Regulation (Sch. of Pub. Pol. Res. Paper 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1877884.
160. A federal regulator may also be cumbersome and expensive, and find it difficult to
effectively regulate legal practice outside of the larger Canadian cities or to respond to
specific practice issues arising out of problems unique to a particular province—for example,
aspects of its rules of courts or real estate laws.
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Under such a system, law societies would retain their power to set
standards of conduct, to screen and investigate complaints, and to determine
whether matters brought to their attention should proceed to the disciplinary
tribunal. While most competence cases would be brought to the dispute
resolution tribunal directly by the complainant, law societies would also
have standing to bring issues related to lawyer performance.
Following the model of England and Wales, each province should also
create a distinct legal regulatory review office. Such an office should
review the decisions of the law societies and recommend modifications or
reconsideration. At least one province, British Columbia, already has an
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction over a wide range of consumer
concerns. 161 Like that Ombudsman, the position proposed here would not
have the power to direct the law society to reach a specific conclusion on
matters of policy or in specific cases. Its mandate would be to provide a
voice for consumer and other interests that are not sufficiently reflected in
law society decision making.
In addition to these structural changes, the substance of lawyer regulation
in Canada also requires revision and expansion. In particular, law societies
should focus greater attention on common consumer grievances and
remedies, especially in relation to excessive fees and gaps in malpractice
insurance coverage. 162 Law societies should emphasize standard-setting
and other proactive oversight activities, rather than simply responding to
specific instances of serious professional misconduct. 163
With respect to non-professional behavior, the statutory power of the law
societies to regulate in the interests of the profession should be abolished
and the focus should be on public protection, not public image. Sanctions
should be reserved for conduct that may undermine the lawyer’s ability to
practice, such as substance abuse, or that suggest dishonesty or willful
violation of court orders. Bar disciplinary processes should not be used to
duplicate the criminal justice system; their role should be narrowly directed
to protection of clients and the justice system.
CONCLUSION
The problems of lawyer regulation in the United States and Canada are
significant, systemic, and structural. But they are not inevitable. Recent
reforms in England, Wales, and Australia lay the foundations for an
oversight framework that is more responsive to public interests. Whether
these changes will achieve their full potential remains to be seen. At the
161. The review power of this Ombudsman extends beyond lawyer regulation to other
governmental functions, and it is not clear how frequently this officer has intervened in
lawyer disciplinary cases. More research is necessary to determine the effectiveness of this
position and what might be necessary to strengthen its oversight in cases involving lawyers.
162. See Woolley, Time for Change, supra note 82; Woolley, supra note 2. All lawyers
in Canada are required to participate in insurance schemes governed by the provincial law
societies. In some provinces, however, the lawyer may not access the insurance scheme if he
or she is found to have engaged in professional misconduct, which undermines client
protection.
163. See Trebilcock, supra note 82, at 224–27.
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very least, however, these reforms promote greater transparency and
accountability, and create the potential for ongoing revision in light of
experience. The United States and Canada could benefit from comparable
strategies.
One value of colloquia like this one is that their international focus
invites more searching scrutiny of insular national practices that ill serve
societal needs. For centuries, the American and Canadian bars have
asserted that self-regulation is critical in maintaining the profession’s
International
“independence from government domination.” 164
comparisons suggest that such independence can be maintained through
co-regulatory structures that also provide greater checks on professional
self-interest and greater responsiveness to consumer concerns. The
challenge remaining for the United States and Canada is to build on these
insights from abroad to inspire national reforms that are long overdue.

164. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. ¶ 11 (2011).

